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Orchestration under Security Constraints
Yannick Chevalier, Mohamed Anis Mekki, Michae¨l Rusinowitch
LORIA & INRIA Nancy Grand Est, France
E-mail: FirstName.LastName@loria.fr
Abstract. Automatic composition of web services is a challenging task. Many
works have considered simplified automata models that abstract away from the
structure of messages exchanged by the services. For the domain of secured ser-
vices (using e.g. digital signing or timestamping) we propose a novel approach
to automated composition of services based on their security policies. Given a
community of services and a goal service, we reduce the problem of composing
the goal from services in the community to a security problem where an intruder
should intercept and redirect messages from the service community and a client
service till reaching a satisfying state. We have implemented the algorithm in
AVANTSSAR Platform [5] and applied the tool to several case studies.
1 Introduction
To meet frequently changing requirements and business needs, for instance in a feder-
ation of enterprises, components are replaced by services that are distributed over the
network (e.g. the Internet) and composed in a demand-driven and flexible way. Service-
oriented architectures (SOAs) have gained much attention as a unifying technical archi-
tecture that can address the challenges of this ever-evolving environment.
Secured Services. Since it is not acceptable in many cases to grant access to a service
to any person present on the Internet, one has to regulate the use of services by policies.
These policies express the context, including the requester’s identity, her credentials,
the link between the service and the requester, and higher-level business rules to which
a service is subject. They also dictate how the information transmitted between services
has to be protected on the wire. In the following we call secured service a service that
is protected by a security policy.
Composition of Secured Services. Each service may rely on the existence and avail-
ability of other (possibly dynamically retrieved) partner services to perform its compu-
tation. For this one needs dynamic adaptation and explicit combination of applicable
policies, which determine the actions to be executed and the messages to be exchanged
in order to satisfy the client requests in accordance with the partners policies. For ex-
ample, a service granting the access to a resource of a business partner may use a local
authentication service, trusted by both partners, to assess the identity of a client and rely
on authorization services on both ends that combine their policies to decide whether to
grant the access or not.
Contribution of this work. For the domain of secured services we propose a novel
approach to automated composition of services based on their security policies. Given a
community of services and a goal service, we reduce the problem of composing the goal
from services in the community to a security problemwhere an intruder should intercept
and redirect messages from both the community services and the client in such a way
that the client service reaches its final state, defined as an insecure one. The approach
amounts to collecting the constraints on messages, parameters and control flow from the
components services and the goal service requirements. A constraint solver checks the
feasibility of the composition, possibly adapting the message structure while preserving
the semantics, and displays the service composition as a message sequence chart. The
resulting composed service can be verified automatically for ensuring that it cannot be
subject to active attacks from intruders. The services that are input to our system are
provided in a declarative way using ASLan [2], a high level specification language. The
approach is fully automatic and we show on a case-study how it succeeds in deriving a
composed service that is currently proposed as a product by a company.
Paper organization. In Section 3 we explain our approach on a simple example. In
Section 4 we introduce the formal model we consider for secured Web services. We
explain the mediator synthesis problem in Subsection 4.1, how to represent messages
in Subsection 4.2, and services in Subsection 4.3. The composition problem is for-
mally stated in Subsection 4.4 and solved in Subsections 4.5 and 4.6. In Subsection 4.7
we formalize the obtained composed service in the ASLan language in order to verify
it automatically against classical security properties. In Section 5 we describe the ex-
periments we have performed on three case-studies and put the focus on one provided
by OpenTrust company. We show how we can derive automatically a Digital Contract
Signing service from their components services. Finally we also prove automatically
that the resulting service cannot be subject to active attacks. We conclude in Section 6
where we give several perspectives.
2 Related work
Most works on Web service composition are based on automata representations of web
services [9, 11, 24], trying to synthesize, from available components, an automata whose
behavior simulates the specification of the goal service. These approaches are focusing
on control flow. For instance. the Roman model [8] focuses on deterministic atomic
actions, and has been extended by data and communication capabilities in the Colombo
model [9]. Synthesis of composite services in [9, 8] is based on Propositional Dynamic
Logic.
Another approach to composition relies on advanced AI planning techniques. For
instance [17] applies these techniques at the knowledge level to address the scalability
problem, retaining only the features of services that are relevant to compose them. Ac-
cording to [24] most solutions in the literature involve too much human encoding or do
not address the problem of data heterogeneity, hence are still far from automatic genera-
tion of executable processes. Given the variations in information representation such as
message-level heterogeneity data mediation is crucial for handling service composition.
Hence our objective is to handle (in some cases) structural and semantic heterogeneity
as defined by [18]. Furthermore we take into account the effects of the security policy
of the services on the format of the messages. An advantage of our approach is that it
can handle automatically message structure adaptation since the orchestrator has capa-
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Goal
Goal
signatureRequest(session(sid),certificate(name,ckey),contract(data))
signaturePolicy(session(sid),policy(footer))
signature(session(sid),SIGNATURE)
SIGNATURE = signature(crypt(inv(ckey),apply(sha1,pair(data,footer))))
signatureResponse(session(sid),TIMESTAMP,ASSERTIONS)
TIMESTAMP = timestamp(time,PROOF,#2,crypt(inv(#2),PROOF)))
PROOF = apply(md5,pair(time,apply(md5,SIGNATURE)))
Fig. 1. Time stamping and archiving a digital signature
bilities (presented by a formal deduction system) to apply operations on messages and
build new messages. This provides for free automatic adaptation of messages for proper
service communications. We also address the problem of checking that the composed
service satisfies some security properties. For the validation of the synthesized service
we can employ directly our cryptographic protocol validation tools [6, 21].
While our approach focuses on the problems related to message adaptation, it is sig-
nificantly less expressive than more standard automata-based techniques when consid-
ering complex goal services. In particular we consider a bounded orchestration problem
in which the number of communications is bounded, thereby excluding iteration com-
pletely. As a consequence we believe that the method presented in this paper is more
complementary with than a concurrent of these standard methods, and that future work
should focus on integrating these approaches in a common framework.
3 Introductory example
Figure 1 illustrates a composition problem corresponding to the creation of a new ser-
vice (described here by Goal) for appending a timestamp to a digital signature per-
formed by a given partner (described here by Client) over some data (described here
by data) and then submitting it together with the signed data and some other proofs for
long time conservation by an archiving third party. More precisely Goal should expect
a first message from Client containing a session identifier sid, the Client’s certificate
containing his identity and his public key ckey and finally the data he wishes to digitally
sign. Goal should answer with a message containing the same session identifier and a
footer value to be appended to the data before the client’s signature. This value aims to
capture the fact that the Client acknowledges a certain chart (known by Goal) before
using the service Goal. Indeed this is what Client is expected to send back to Goal.
Goal should then append to the received digital signature (described by SIGNATURE)
a timestamp (described by TIMESTAMP). The timestamp consists of a time value which
is bound to the Client’s signature (through the use of md5 hash) and signed by a trusted
timestamper’s private key #2.
Goal should also include a certain number of assertions or proofs about its response
message. ASSERTIONS is described below and consists of 4 assertions or judgments.
ASSERTIONS = ASSRT0,ASSRT1,ASSRT2,ASSRT3
ASSRT0 = assertion(cOCSPR,#0,crypt(inv(#0),cOCSPR))
cOCSPR = ocspr(name,ckey,time)
ASSRT1 = assertion(tsOCSPR,#0,crypt(inv(#0),tsOCSPR))
tsOCSPR = ocspr(#1,#2,time)
ASSRT2 = assertion(arcOCSPR,#0,crypt(inv(#0),arcOCSPR))
arcOCSPR = ocspr(#3,#4,time)
ASSRT3 = assertion(ARCH,#4,crypt(inv(#4),ARCH))
ARCH = archived(session(sid),certificate(name,ckey),
contract(data), SIGNATURE,TIMESTAMP,ASSRT0,ASSRT1)
#0 in trustedCAKeys
pair(#1,#2) in trustedTSs
pair(#3,#4) in trustedARs
ASSRT0 is a judgment made about the validity of the Client’s certificate at the time
time and signed by a certification authority trusted by Client. This trust relation is mod-
eled by the fact that the public key of the certification authority is in the set trusted-
CAKeys representing the public keys of the certification authorities trusted by Client.
ASSRT1,ASSRT2 represent similar judgments made about the certificates of the used
timestamper and archiving service and signed by the same trusted certification author-
ity. On the other hand ASSRT3 models the fact that the data to be signed by Client, its
digital signature together with a timestamp and all the proofs obtained for the different
involved certificates have been successfully archived by an archiving third party which
is in addition trusted by Client for this task: here also this trust relationship is modeled
by the constraint: pair(#3,#4) in trustedARs. These assertions are encoded as certifi-
cates embedded in the messages. They represent either a condition φ evaluated before
accepting a message or a guarantee ψ ensured by the service sending a message.
Finally the use of dashed communication lines in Figure 1 refers to additional con-
straints on the communication channels used by Client and Goal: in our example this
turns to be a transport constraint requiring the use of SSL. We can express this constraint
in our model by requiring that the concerned messages are ciphered by a symmetric key
previously shared between both participants (the key establishment phase is not handled
by the composed service).
In order to satisfy the requests of Client, Goal relies on a community of available
services ranging from timestampers, and archiving third party to certification authori-
ties.
These services are also given by their interface, i.e. the description of the precise
message patterns they accept and they provide in consequence. For instance Figure 2
A ny Service
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CA
CA
CVRequest(mode)
certificate(name,key)
assertion(OCSPR,cakey,crypt(inv(cakey),OCSPR))
OCSPR = ocspr(name,key,time)
alt [mode = "OCSP"]
currentCRL(crl)
alt [mode = "CRL"]
loop
Fig. 2. Available services: Certification Authority
describes a certification authority CA capable of providing two sorts of answers when
asked about the validity of a certificate: one is OCSP-based (i.e. based on the Online
Certificate Status Protocol) and returns a proof containing a real-time time-bound for
the validity of a given certificate; while the second only provides the classical Certificate
Revocation List CRL. Intuitively by inspecting the composition problem one can think
that to satisfy the Client request the second mode should always be employed with CA
(provided it is also trusted by the Client). One can also deduce that some adaptation
should be employed over the Client’s messages to obtain the right message patterns
(possibly containing assertions) from the community (for example the use of the flag
OCSP with CA).
The solution we propose computes whenever it is possible the sequence of calls to
the service community possibly interleaved with adaptations over the already received
messages and permitting to satisfy the Client’s requests as specified in the composition
problem.
4 Formal Description of Service Composition and Adaptation
4.1 Mediator synthesis
A web service is in standard way described in terms of the interface it presents to the
outside world (the possible clients) using the WSDL [23] language. This description
is structured into ports, each proposing a set of available operations. An operation is
then defined by its given in-bound and out-bound message patterns; these patterns are
usually described using the XSD [26] language and reflects the XML message structure.
Security constraints can then be defined on top of the service interface description us-
ing WS-SecurityPolicy [16] annotations. Such annotations can occur at any level in the
WSDL binding the levels they occur into the security constraints they carry. They range
from the service to the message level and typical examples are an SSL transport require-
ment for the whole service or the need to cipher or digitally sign a certain part inside
a message pattern (in-bound or out-bound to some operation). We note that the use of
XSD for the description of message patterns permits the use of the XPATH [25] language
to write the queries identifying parts inside these message patterns which simplifies the
writing of message-level security constraints. We put the focus on SOAP-based (in con-
trast with RESTful-based) web services. These services rely on the SOAP [19] protocol
that encapsulates the messages described in the WSDL specification of the service. We
claim that after (automated) analysis we can collect from the different specification
files the descriptions of the different message patterns in-bound and out-bound to all
the operations of the service and corresponding to the messages really exchanged by
the service (SOAP encapsulation included). These descriptions are discussed below.
4.2 Representation of messages and security constraints
We use first-order terms to represent the messages exchanged by a service. We recall
this notion below.
Terms We consider an infinite set of free constants Consts and an infinite set of vari-
ables X . For each signature F (i.e. a set of function symbols with arities), we denote
by T(F) (resp. T(F ,X )) the set of terms over F ∪ Consts (resp. F ∪ Consts ∪ X ).
The former is called the set of ground terms (or messages) over F , while the latter is
simply called the set of terms over F . Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of
variables occurring in t. A substitution σ is an idempotent mapping from X to T(F ,X )
such that Supp(σ) = {x | σ(x) 6= x}, the support of σ, is a finite set. The application
of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is
equal to the term t (resp. E) where all variables x have been respectively replaced by
the term xσ. Terms are manipulated by applying operations on them. These operations
are defined by a subset Fp of the signature F called the set of public symbols. A con-
text C[x1, . . . , xn] is a term in which all symbols are public and such that its nullary
symbols are the variables x1, . . . , xn. C[x1, . . . , xn] is also denoted C when there’s no
ambiguity and n is called its length. We define the application of a context C of length
n over the sequence of messages 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉, denoted byC ·〈m1, . . . ,mn〉, to be the
image of C[X1, . . . , Xn] by the substitution {Xj → mj}1≤j≤n. An equational theory
E is defined by a set E of equations u = v with u, v ∈ T(F ,X ). We write s =E t
as the congruence relation between two terms s and t. This equational theory is intro-
duced in order to specify the effects of operations on the messages and the properties
of messages. We say that a term t is deducible from a set of terms E whenever there
exists a sequence of elements 〈t1, . . . , tkt〉 in E and a context Ct of length kt such that
C · 〈t1, . . . , tkt〉 =E t.
XML messages We aim to represent a significant fragment of XML messages as de-
scribed by the XSD language using first-order terms defined over a signature given
below. The fragment we address corresponds to XML elements, described by sequential
complex types, i.e. elements having an ordered and a fixed-cardinality set of children.
We also abstract away the attributes in XML messages. To represent XML messages we
define the following signature:
F =
{
nodena , child
n
i
a
| i ≤ a ∈ N, n ∈ Consts
}
∪
{scrypt, sdcrypt, crypt, dcrypt, sign, verif, inv, invtest,⊤}
where the symbol nodena represents an XML node named n (ranging over the set of
constants Consts) and having a children. For each symbol nodena we define the set
of symbols childn1
a
, . . . , childna
a
permitting to extract its children. In order to model
security constraints holding over exchanged XMLmessages, we also represent the usual
cryptographic primitives through the use of symbols: scrypt/sdcrypt for symmetric
encryption and decryption, crypt/dcrypt for asymmetric encryption and decryption,
sign/verif for digital signature and its verification, inv to denote key inverses and
invtest permitting to test whether a pair of terms {t, t′} verifies t′ = inv(t). The
constant ⊤ is the result of a successful test. We denote by Fp, the set of public symbols
and assume in the remainder of this chapter that Fp = F \ {inv}.
Some of the symbols represent the possible operations on the messages. Their se-
mantics is defined with the following equational theory:
EXML


sdcrypt(scrypt(x, y), y) = x (Ds)
dcrypt(crypt(x, y), inv(y)) = x (Das)
verif(x, sign(x, inv(y)), y) = ⊤ (Sv)
childni
a
(nodena(x1, . . . , xa)) = xi (P i
a
)
invtest(x, inv(x)) = ⊤ (Iv)
We say that a term t is deducible (we use also deduced) from a set of terms E
whenever there exists a sequence of elements 〈t1, . . . , tkt〉 in E and a context Ct of
length kt such that C · 〈t1, . . . , tkt〉 =EXML t.
4.3 Representation of services
We note that the WSDL specification of a web service does not precisely list any or-
der of invocation for its operations but only gives their exhaustive list. Moreover this
specification does not mention how the input parameters are related to the output pa-
rameters for a given operation. The BPEL [22] language allows reasoning about such
properties by permitting first to specify a certain workflow logic for the service, and
second to specify all the manipulations needed to construct the sent messages given the
received ones. In this sense BPEL describes business processes which are structured
workflows of activities ranging over invocation of web service operations, providing of
web services operations or manipulation of messages.
We consider services that do not contain any iteration or replication. Here we shall
also abstract from internal actions and we shall focus on communications. Therefore
a service S will be considered as a sequence of in- and out-bound messages denoted
respectively RCV(m) and SND(m).
We assume that all the services we consider are also described in terms of their
respective BPEL specification and focus only on services described by linear processes,
i.e. sequences of activities. Therefore a service S will be considered as a sequence of
in- and out-bound messages denoted respectivelyRCV (m) and SND(m) as described
by the following grammar:
P,Q := services
0 null service
RCV (m) · P input message
SND(m) · P output message
P ‖ Q AC parallel composition
Parallel composition of services S1 and S2 is denoted by S1 ‖ S2. It is associative
and commutative, and has a unit element 0, the null process. We consider a community
to be a parallel composition of all its available services.
In the following we say that a term t is deducible (or deduced) from a service S
whenever t is deducible from the sequence 〈m1, . . . ,mkS 〉 representing the messages
received by the service S.
Transition semantics We introduce transition semantics to define how services are
executed in interaction with their environment and in particular with clients. The state
of a service S can be viewed as the list of remaining operations it has to perform to end
properly. For instance the service in stateRCV (r)·S′ waiting for a message matching r
proceeds with S′σ if it is added in parallel to a service in state SND(m) ·S such thatm
matches r with some substitution σ. In this case the latter service proceeds then with S.
The global configuration is a pair (S, E) with first component the set of service states,
and second component the set of messages that have been sent so far. The evolution of
the global configuration is given by the transition rule:
(RCV (r) · S ‖ (SND(m) · S′ ‖ . . . , E)
m
→ (Sσ ‖ S′ ‖ . . . , E ∪ {m})
if ∃σ, rσ = m
Such transitions are called communication transitions.
The reception of a message instantiates the variables in the receive pattern. This
instantiation is applied on the variables remaining in the process that describes the ser-
vice. A derivation is a sequence of transitions. The size of derivation is the size of its
sequence of transitions. We say that a service has ended in a derivation if it is reduced
to a null process.
4.4 Web services composition problem
Composition Goal To answer a client C request we often need a new service T to be
obtained as a composition of some of the ones that are available in the community. We
define the composition goal as the ordered list of messages that C should receive from
T and that T should receive from C. Hence the composition goal is also a service that
can be specified with the service grammar given above.
Composition mediator We exploit a derivation as follows to generate a mediator. The
messages sent by the services are dispatched by the mediator and they can possibly be
adapted before assigning them to the proper recipient. In order to express this adaptation
capability of the mediator, we simply define the following transition rule:
(P, E)
C
−→ (P, E ∪ {m})
if there exists a context C and t1, . . . , tn in E s.t C[t1, . . . , tn] =EXML m
We call such transitions adaptation transitions.
The problem we are interested in is to check whether a client C can be satisfied by
a composition of services from the community. More formally we can state it as:
Service Composition Problem
Input: A community of service S = {S1, . . . , Sn}
A composition goal C (specified by the client requests)
Output: A derivation from initial state (S ∪ {C}, ∅) to a state where
C has ended, and each service in S has either ended or is in
its initial state, if such a derivation exists and the symbol ⊥
otherwise.
In other word we have to check for the existence of a derivation (applying the tran-
sition rules) from an initial state where the client is put in parallel with the community
of services and no messages have been sent so far, to a state where all requests from the
client have been satisfied (C has ended) and the services from the community that have
been initiated have properly terminated.
4.5 Solving the composition problem
Theorem 1. The Service Composition Problem is NP-complete.
Sketch of proof: We reduce the Service Composition Problem to showing the existence
of an attack on a protocol built from the services and the client (given the EXML theory).
To ensure proper termination of services that are involved in an interaction with the
client, we guess at the beginning whether a service Si will be employed or not. Let
{S′1, . . . , S
′
m} be the subset of services to be really employed. After this guessing step
the composition problem is reduced to the reachability of a configuration (0, E) from a
configuration (C ‖ S′1 ‖ . . . ‖ S
′
m, ∅) with {S
′
1, . . . , S
′
m} ⊆ {S1, . . . , Sn}
For each service S · 0 in {C, S′1, . . . , S
′
m} we introduce a new constant cS and
transform the service S · 0 into a service S = S · SND(cS) · 0. It is clear that a service
S reduces to the null process if, and only if, S sends cS . Finally we add a monitor
serviceM to the community that checks that all constants are sent. We let
M = RCV (cC) ·RCV (cS′
1
) . . . RCV (cS′
m
) · SND(secret) · 0
It is clear thatM sends secret if and only if all the services C, S′1, . . . , S
′
m reduce
to the null process. Thus we have transformed the problem of the reachability of a
configuration (0, E) from a configuration (C ‖ S′1 ‖ . . . ‖ S
′
m, ∅) into the problem of the
reachability of a configuration (P, E ′) with secret ∈ E ′ from the initial configuration
(M ‖ C ‖ S′1 ‖ . . . ‖ S
′
m, ∅). This latter problem is a classic problem for cryptographic
protocols and is called the Protocol insecurity problem. Since the existence of an attack
on a protocol is a problem known to be in NP [20] we can conclude. ✷
The protocol insecurity problem corresponding to our composition problem can
then be submitted to any state-of-the-art protocol verification tool capable of checking
reachability properties. If the composition problem admits a solution we obtain an at-
tack trace (or a conversation trace) describing how the intruder (or the mediator from
a composition point of view) succeeded into satisfying the clients requests by applying
its adaptation skills on messages exchanged with some services in the community.
For instance Figure 3 illustrates the solution for the composition problem stated in
the introductory example.
To fulfill the Client’s requests (messagesM1 andM3) the mediator first calls (with
messages M4 and M5) the certification authority service denoted by CA to obtain an
assertion (messageM6) stating the validity of the Client’s certificate. Then he calls the
timestamper denoted by TS and trusted by the Client (with message M7) to obtain a
timestamp (messageM8) and subsequently CA (with messagesM9 thenM10) to ob-
tain an assertion (messageM11) stating the validity of TS’s certificate. Then he calls an
archiving third party service ARC trusted by the Client (with messageM12) to obtain
assertions (in message M13) stating that the Client’s timestamped signature was cor-
rectly archived. Finally the mediator calls CA (with messagesM14 andM15) to obtain
the last needed assertion (messageM16) stating the validity of ARC’s certificate, before
successfully answering the last request of the Client (with messageM17).
We remark that the mediator serviceM is easily extractable from the conversation
trace. This can be done by running through all the communication steps in the conver-
sation trace, putting the focus on those involving the mediator and updating its service
description as follows:
– if the communication step is S →M : t, append RCV (t) toM ;
– otherwise, append SND(t) toM .
On the other hand, by definition of a composition problem, a corresponding solution
should also describe all the adaptation steps that have to be performed by the medi-
ator. These adaptation steps are abstracted away in the conversation trace depicted in
Figure 3, which is a typical result of the state-of-the-art protocol verification tools. For
instance, one could intuitively state that the message M5 sent by the mediator to CA
can be extracted from the message M1 (previously sent to him by Client) by taking
its second child. We present in Section 4.6 an automated procedure permitting to com-
pute all these adaptation steps from a conversation trace similar to the one illustrated in
Figure 3.
Client Goal CA TS ARC
M1
M2
M3
M4
M5
M6
M7
M8
M9
M10
M11
M12
M13
M14
M15
M16
M17
(a) Trace
Client Goal CA TS ARC
M1= signatureRequest(session(sid),certificate(name,ckey),contract(data))M2= signaturePolicy(session(sid),policy(footer))M3= signature(session(sid),SIGNATURE)M4=CVRequest("OCSP")M5= certificate(name,ckey)M6=assertion(cOCSPR,cakey,sign(inv(cakey),cOCSPR))M7= timeStampRequest(SIGNATURE)M8= timeStampResponse(TIMESTAMP)M9=CVRequest("OCSP")M10= certificate(TS,tskey)M11=assertion(tsOCSPR,cakey,sign(inv(cakey),tsOCSPR))M12=archiveRequest(session(sid),certificate(name,ckey),contract(data),SIGNATURE,TIMESTAMP,ASSRT0,ASSRT1)M13=archiveResponse(ARCH,assertions(ASSRT3))M14=CVRequest("OCSP")M15= certificate(ARC,arckey)M16=assertion(arcOCSPR,cakey,sign(inv(cakey),arcOCSPR))M17= signatureResponse(session(sid),TIMESTAMP,ASSERTIONS)
(b) Messages
Fig. 3. Solution for the composition problem in the introductory example
4.6 Generating the Mediator’s Adaptation Steps
A conversation trace describes partially the solution of a given composition problem.
Indeed, it only illustrates the ordered sequence of all communication transitions present
in the corresponding derivation. Therefore for all communication step i in the trace, we
can extract the following communication transition:
δi = (Pi, Ei)
mi−→ (Pi+1, Ei ∪ {mi})
where (Pi, Ei) (resp.mi) is the configuration before executing step i (resp. the message
exchanged at the communication step i). We propose now to enrich this subsequence
by interposing the missing adaptation transitions between the existing communication
transitions, in order to reconstruct a complete solution of the problem.
Let us first remark that this enrichment may not be unique, and solutions of the com-
position problem can have an arbitrarily large size. Indeed if the derivation contains at
least one adaptation transition, resulting in adding some messagem to the environment
one can build an infinity of messages (denoted by T (m)) by applying public symbols to
m and since the environment is finite then one can enrich the derivation with an adap-
tation transition resulting in adding some new term from T (m) to the environment. To
ensure the finiteness of the enrichment we will consider only adaptation transitions that
add subterms occurring in the conversation trace to the environment. Since the inference
system associated to the EXML equational theory enjoys the locality [14] property
1,
such an enrichment always exists.
To compute a derivation solving a composition problem given the corresponding
conversation trace we first compute for each communication step i, the set Enewi of the
subterms ti1, . . . , t
i
k occurring in the trace and deduced by the mediator only starting
from that step. We also keep track of Cnewi the sequence of contexts 〈Cti
1
, . . . , Cti
k
〉 that
permit to construct these subterms from the current knowledge in the order according
to which they were constructed. Then we construct ∆i for each communication step i
as described below:
∆i =
C
ti
1−→ (Pi+1, Ei ∪
{
mi, t
i
1
}
) . . .
C
ti
k−1
−→ (Pi+1, Ei ∪
{
mi, t
i
1, . . . , t
i
k−1
}
)
C
ti
k−→
Finally we construct:
∆ = δ1∆1 . . . δn∆n
which is a solution of the composition problem. To prove the last statement, it is suffi-
cient to prove that (i) ∆ is a derivation and (ii) ∆ solves the composition problem and
both are true by construction.
We put the focus now on the computation of the set Enewi and the sequence C
new
i
for all communication step i. We recall that Enewi is the set of subterms occurring in the
trace and deduced by the mediator only starting from the communication step i and that
by construction we have: Enewi = Ei \ Ei−1 with E0 = ∅. One important remark here
is that only receptions steps bring new knowledge to the mediator. After a reception of
a messagemi, the mediator tries all the possible applications of equations in EXML to
his current knowledge including the messagemi and possibly computes new subterms
occurring in the trace.
We now introduce the notion of sequents which we will use to compute the set Ei
for all reception step i.
Definition 1. Given a service S we call γ a sequent of S (denoted by t1, . . . , tk ⊢f t0)
an equality t0 =EXML f(t1, . . . , tk) where f is a public symbol and t0, . . . , tk is
a sequence of subterms occurring in S. We call respectively t0, f and the sequence
t1, . . . , tk the head, the symbol and the tail of γ and denote them respectively by h(γ),
s(γ) and t(γ). We denote the set of all sequents of S by Γ (S) and the set of all valid
sequents at some step i by Γi(S).
We say that γ is valid at some step i when for all 0 ≤ j ≤ k, tj ∈ Ei. We remark that
if a sequent γ is valid at step i then its head is an element of Ei. Indeed t0 is deducible
at step i by taking t0 =EXML f(t1, . . . , tk). We exploit this property to compute the set
Γi(Mediator) for all reception step i of the mediator service.
First we compute Γ (Mediator) by running through all the subterms occurring in it
and collecting the corresponding sequents. For example a subterm of the form t =
scrypt(k,m) will provide two entries: k,m ⊢scrypt t and k, t ⊢sdcrypt m. For each
computed sequent γ we define an integer called its readiness and initially set to the
size of t(γ). This integer is used to compute the validity of a sequent as explained
1 Informally speaking, this property means that whenever a secrecy attack on a subterm t exists
for a given protocol, then the intruder can reproduce a secrecy attack on t where he needs to
derive only a subset of the subterms occurring in the protocol or in t.
further in this paragraph. For each subterm t we define two fields: dstep which will
hold the least reception step i where t is deduced and context which will hold the
context that permitted to deduce t. We also define for each subterm t of s a list of
sequents sequents(t) which is initialized by all the sequents γ′ such that t appears in
the tail of γ′.
Then the idea is to perform a fix-point computation per each step i corresponding to
the set Γi(Mediator). The detailed solution is illustrated by Algorithm 1 which relies
on Algorithm 2 and both are given below.
Algorithm 1 Compute Deduced Subterms
Require: Mediator : Service
1: for all RCV (mk) ∈Mediator do
2: deduce(mk, k)
3: end for
We start from subterms that are trivially deduced at some given step i.e. all the re-
ceived messages clearly deduced at their corresponding reception step and try to deduce
the new ones by checking whether there exists some sequents having their tails made
only of already deduced subterms. In order to select these sequents we make use of the
readiness field attached to each sequent which is decremented each time one element
in its tail is deduced (Algorithm 2, line 4). Since the readiness field is initialized by
the cardinality of its tail thus whenever γ.readiness equals zero at some step then the
sequent is also valid at that step.
Algorithm 2 deduce
Require: t : subterm, i : step
1: if t.dstep > i then
2: t.dstep← i
3: t.context = γ
4: for all γ ∈ sequents(t) do
5: γ.readiness−−
6: if γ.readiness = 0 then
7: Γi(p).add(γ)
8: deduce(h(γ), i)
9: end if
10: end for
11: end if
Algorithm 1 runs in linear time in the size of mediator service represented as a
directed acyclic graph (DAG).
4.7 Generating the Mediator’s ASLan Specification
The ASLan Language
Background 2 ASLan (AVANTSSAR Specification Language) is defined by extending
the Intermediate Format (IF) [7]. IF is an expressive language for specifying security
protocols and their properties, based on multiset rewriting. As described in detail in [1],
ASLan extends IF with a number of important features so as to express diverse security
policies, security goals, communication and intruder models at a suitable abstraction
level, and thereby allow for the formal specification and analysis of complex services
and service-oriented architectures.
Most notably, ASLan extends IF with support of Horn clauses and LTL formulas.
For instance invariants of the system can be defined by a set of (definite) Horn clauses.
Horn clauses allow us not only to capture the deduction abilities of the attacker in a
natural way, but also, and most importantly, they allow for the incorporation of autho-
rization logics in specifications of services. Moreover, complex security properties can
be specified in Linear Temporal Logic. As shown, for instance, in [3], this allows us to
express complex security goals that services are expected to meet as well as assump-
tions on the security offered by the communication channels.
Syntax and Semantics Here, we recall the main features of ASLan, pointing the reader
to [2] for more details on the language.
An ASLan file consists of several sections, among which:
emphSection Inits contains one or more initial states of the transition system. A state of
a transition system is a set of variable-free facts.
emphSection Rules specifies the transitions of the transition system. A transition is a
rule containing two parts, a left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS). The rule
can fire in a state whenever its LHS holds in that state. Moreover, a transition can be
labeled with a list of existentially quantified variables whose purpose is to introduce
new constants representing fresh data (e.g. nonces).
Example 1. Sample transition.
1 step sampleTransition(BankAgent):=
2 state_BankingService(BankAgent,1).
3 iknows(request)
4 =>
5 state_BankingService(BankAgent,2).
6 iknows(response)
where
– step is a keyword used to define a new transition;
– sampleTransition is a transition name;
– BankAgent is a parameter of the transition;
– state BankingService (BankAgent,1), iknows(request ),
state BankingService (BankAgent,2), iknows(response) are facts;
– state BankingService (BankAgent,1).iknows(request ) is the LHS of the transition;
– state BankingService (BankAgent,2).iknows(response) is the RHS of the transition.
2 excerpts from [2]
This transition represents the behavior of a banking service that receives a request
and then reacts by replying with a response and moving to another state. More pre-
cisely, the transition can be fired if there exists a value val of variable BankAgent such
that state BankingService ( val ,1) and iknows(request ) are in the current state. The re-
sult of firing the transition is to replace the fact state BankingService ( val ,1) by the fact
state BankingService ( val ,2) and add a new fact iknows(response).
Message sending and receiving are specified using iknows facts: the iknows in the
LHS of a transition stands for receiving a message, while in the RHS of a transition it
stands for sending a message. The fact iknows(request ) of Example 1 will not disappear
from the current state, because the predicate iknows is persistent: once a message is
emitted, it becomes a part of the knowledge of the environment (i.e., of the network
or of the intruder) and the environment does not “forget” it. If the LHS of a transition
holds in the current state, then it is assumed that the knowledge (represented by a set
of ground facts) of the corresponding service is enough to build the messages stated in
iknows in the RHS of the transition.
We use one predicate per service to specify the service states. By convention the
predicate name starts with state followed by the service name, e.g. state BankingService
from Example 1.
– Section Goals: contains security goals that can be defined as attack states (special
states of the transition system) or by means of LTL formulae.
Example 2. Sample attack state.
1 attack_state stateName(Msg):=
2 fact1(Msg).
3 fact2(Msg)
Here, attack state stateName is reached, if there exists a value val of variable Msg
such that fact1 ( val ) and fact2 ( val ) are in the current state of the transition system.
Section HornClauses: contains a finite set of Horn clauses. They can specify, for
instance, the authorization logic.
ASLan Generation Procedure We build a transition system specified in ASLan and
representing a prudent implementation of the mediator service M . First we consider
a list A = 〈a1, . . . , an〉 of all the subterms occurring in M deduced by M (at some
communication step) such that for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, ai.dstep ≤ aj .dstep and
we associate a fresh variable name per each atom in A through a bijective mapping
σ−1 : ai 7→ Xi. We then create a state fact state M forM with the following profile
type: type(a1)∗. . .∗type(an) → fact. For each receptionRCV (m) inM we generate
an ASLan transition τ having only the fact iknows(σ−1(m)) in its RHS. We note that
σ−1(m) is well defined, since every message m received by p is trivially reachable by
her. For each emission SND(m) inM we generate an ASLan transition τ having only
the fact iknows(σ−1(m)) in its LHS. Again we note here that every message m sent
by the mediatorM has been already deduced by him and thus σ−1(m) is well defined.
We introduce the variable renaming functions {V Namej}1≤j≤length(c) to distin-
guish whether a value has been assigned to the variableXm or not yet in a transition. For
each transition labeled by step j we respectively append to its LHS and RHS the facts
state M(〈V Namej−1(Xi)〉1≤i≤n) and state M(〈V Namej(Xi)〉1≤i≤n) where the
functions V Namej map variables to ASLan variable names as follows:
V Namej(Xi) =
{
NI Xi, if σ(Xi).dstep ≥ j;
Xi, otherwise.
Finally we specify the initial state of the partner: state n(〈ni Xi〉1≤i≤n). Infor-
mally speaking we initialize (with dummy values) the variables corresponding to atoms
that will be seen in received messages or generated as nonces in messages to be sent.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Avantssar Platform
The above mediator construction has been implemented in AVANTSSAR Platform [5],
as the Orchestrator module. A solution of the orchestration problem (the description
of the mediator) is automatically extracted from the attack trace and then translated to
ASLan using the Trace2ASLan module. It provides us with an operational implemen-
tation of the new feature provided by the composed service (or mediator). The com-
bination of this implementation and the available services is validated with respect to
regular security properties (and in prescript of all other partner services) in presence of
an active intruder. The validation task is performed by the AVANTSSAR backends. The
overall architecture is displayed in Figure 5. We have applied the AVANTSSAR Plat-
form to three case-studies from the AVANTSSAR Test Library [4] (putting the focus
on composition problems). In the following we describe one of these case-studies then
we provide the execution times needed to solve the three corresponding orchestration
problems as well as the one in the introductory example.
5.2 Running Case Study
Description. We have applied the AVANTSSAR Platform to a digital contract signing
(DCS) case study, provided by OpenTrust. A Business Portal (BP) is provided to parties
that plan to digitally sign a contract. The goal of this case study is to automatically
compose a security server (SeS) that will interact with this security portal as well as
with available services to satisfy the security constraints.We assume that the community
of services available to compose SeS contains the following services:
Timestamper: An external service that provides a timestamping functionality. We ab-
stract the protocol employed to communicate with this service with a simple pay-
load exchange with an assertion guaranteeing the timestamp’s freshness;
PKI: A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is employed to check the validation keys of the
customers. Again, we abstract away the protocols employed to communicate with
this or these PKI, and rely on an assertion to characterize the PKI functionality.
Archiver: An archiver service is also accessible. We are doing coarse grain composi-
tion, and simply abstract this service with an assertion stating that this service is
trusted for long-term storage.
Security constraints. There were several constraints on the SeS. We list here the main
ones: i) The exchange between the BP and the SeS must be secured using the HTTPS
protocol ii) The contracts have to be stored securely.
Client service. In addition to the compliance with the above constraints, the SeS
provider that we generate has to be able to be the security server partner in the BP
process. To this end we have extracted the message exchange session with the SeS part-
ner from the BP definition, and imposed that the generated service interacts with the
BP. In the process the customers were completely abstracted away.
Orchestration. We run CL-Atse [21], one of the back-end of Avispa Tool suite, with
the ASLan specification described above. It returns an attack on the secrecy of a newly
introduced constant (signaling the end of the client service), which corresponds to the
trace of the messages exchanged between the component services (and the Business
Portal). This trace is displayed in Figure 4 and can be directly translated to a composed
service for Digital Contract Signing.
Validation of the composed service. The trace computed for the composition and
adaptation of services has been automatically translated to an ASLan specification of
the mediator which has been added in parallel with the specification modeling the avail-
able services and the client. We have applied CL-Atse to verify some security properties
of the resulting composition to validate the secrecy of the proof record and the authen-
tication of the BP by the security server.
5.3 Testing benchmark
We briefly describe two other composition problems from the AVANTSSAR Library.
– Public Bidding (PB): PB illustrates a secure document exchange, and aims at pro-
viding a web portal (the Bidding Portal (BiP)) to manage an online call for tender,
and also Bidders’ proposal submissions. The composition problem associated to
this case-study amounts to generating the BiP’s behavior satisfying the requests of
two bidders.
– Car Registration Process (CRP): CRP models an e-government scenario, where a
citizen have a secure access point, enabling communication with government offi-
cers (with a hierarchical chief, the Officer Head (OfH)) and service providers in an
easily usable and secure way. From this portal, citizens may access a great variety of
services with different authentication, authorization, and protection requirements.
The composition problem associated to this case-study amounts to generating the
OfH’s behavior that leads the government officers to satisfy some citizen’s car reg-
istration request.
One common concern in these case-studies (including DCS) is to guarantee the legal
value of the electronic documents produced. The security requirements imposed on such
Table 1. Execution Times
Case-Study Composition Time ASLan Generation Time Verification Time
Introductory Example 30 s 163 ms 708 ms
DCS 1 m 659 ms 3 m
PB 1 m 4 s 18 m
CRP 2 m 3 s 4 m
platforms are highly critical since the probative value of digitally signed documents
relies on the conditions under which they have been produced and validated.
Table 1 illustrates per each case-study the different execution times needed to solve
the composition problem, to generate the ASLan specification of the mediator (and add
it in parallel to the initial specification) and finally to verify the resulting specification.
6 Conclusion
Relying on cryptographic protocols analysis methods we succeeded into solving a class
of web services composition problem. The next step is to generate an executable media-
tor service from the produced ASLan specification. We also need to ensure for security
reasons that the generated mediator code controls and protects as much as possible the
messages it sends and receives. We have already obtained initial results in this direction.
A second research line is to extend the presented works to services with more complex
workflows.
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7 Appendix
In Fig. 4 we have employed the following abbreviations:
M1 = {signature sent(s1 · contract · {sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks1))
·{sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy)} (inv(pks1))} kbpss
M2 = timestamp ok(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N)
·sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N)) (inv(pkts))) · n267(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N))} (inv(pkts))
M3 = timestamp ok(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N))} inv(pkts))
·timestamp ok(sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy) · n258(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy) · n258(N))} inv(pkts) · n267(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N))} inv(pkts) · n258(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy) · n258(N))} inv(pkts)
M4 = signature sent(s1 · contract · {sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks1))
·signature sent(s2 · contract · {sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks2)
·{sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks1) · {sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks2)
M5 = {contract · s1 · signaturepolicy · {sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy)} (inv(pks1))
·n267(N) · {sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N))} (inv(pkts))
·{sha1(s1 · pks1)} inv(pkpki) · {sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy)} (inv(pks2)) · n258(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy) · n258(N))} inv(pkts) · {sha1(s2 · pks2)} inv(pkpki)} kssarc
M6 = archive ok(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy · {sha1(contract · s1 · SignaturePolicy(3))} inv(pks1)
·n267(N) · {sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N))} (inv(pkts)) · {sha1(s1 · pks1)} inv(pkpki)
·{sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks2) · n258(N)
·{sha1(sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy) · n258(N))} inv(pkts) · {sha1(s2 · pks2)} inv(pkpki))
M7 = archive ok(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy · {sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks1)
·n267(N) · {sha1(sha1(contract · s1 · signaturepolicy) · n267(N))} inv(pkts)·
{sha1(s1 · pks1)} inv(pkpki) · {sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy)} inv(pks2) · n258(N)
·{sha1(contract · s2 · signaturepolicy · n258(N))} inv(pkts) · {sha1(s2 · pks2)} (inv(pkpki)))
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